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ABSTRACT 
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), widely prevalent in corporate 
environments, is a current giant leap in information technology. This new paradigm of 
communications has leverage over other ways of data transmission, because it enables 
businesses and corporate environments to operate in a fast, better and more profitable way. 
Through the use of always-on, always-connected and always-available content and 
applications, WLAN combines data connectivity with user mobility. 
The IEEE standard for wireless LAN is 802.11. The 802.11 is emerging as a 
significant aspect of Internetworking. Growing rapidly in the wireless local area network 
environment, 802.11 s are easy to find, because wireless technology allows the network to go 
where wire cannot. This fact, however, raises a number of security concerns. 
The current security solutions offered on a private 802.11 network in a public setting 
are not sufficient to protect sensitive material, so other measures are needed to provide 
adequate protection for data passed over the air. Although encryption, authentication and 
authorization are the pillars of security, there are other techniques that can be used and 
implemented for network defense. Security concerns have evolved, because there are 
limitations and weaknesses in controlling access and there are flaws and vulnerabilities in 
WEP data encryption. These things add to the insecure nature of radio broadcast 
transmission. 
This study discusses some security models offered over wireless networks and 
integrates the security enhancement by combining some of the wired techniques such as 
adding Kerberos to the wireless security equation along with RADIUS for increased 
authentication and authorization so that compromising the network is a non-trivial task. 
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Those models are designed to prevent unauthorized access to the network from outside the 
wireless network environment. While we can make intrusion difficult, we cannot prevent 
hackers with portable devices and scanners from intercepting data and gaining access to the 
network. lfwe want flexibility and mobility, we can have this, but not with total security. 
The 802.11 technology protection is not failsafe as long as there is technology that allows 
portable computing devices with scanners to gain access to the LAN or intercept data. 
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CHAPTER I 
SCOPE OF PROJECT 
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) security is a major topic. "The 
wireless networking standard, 802.11 b has recently become more and more popular due to its 
convenience and falling prices of the hardware" (Eng Tion Ow, 2001 www.sans.org). This 
study focuses on the security of the IEEE 802.11 standard in an infrastructure mode. I start 
this research by focusing on an in-depth analysis of the current security mechanisms used to 
protect wireless networks based on 802.11 b standard and check the current reported 
vulnerabilities and flaws in the design. 
Based on this study and current known flaws in wireless security revealed at this 
time, an adequate security mechanism should be implemented in a wireless environment 
involving security measures that makes it difficult to compromise the network, whether the 
attack is performed by an individual with off-shelf tools sniffing packets transmitted through 
air, or by a group of people with lots of resources and CPU power collecting data and 
analyzing the network's behavior trying to break through and gain access. "Wireless 
networks are inherently less secure than wired networks and must be treated so. If proper 
measures are taken, they can be made secure enough to meet the needs of most people and 
organizations" (James Voorhees, 2002 www.sans.org). The media transmission for wireless 
is the air, which eliminates the physical protection. Packets travel beyond the area of which 
they are supposed to cover making wireless networks vulnerable for eavesdropping from 
places as far as hundreds of yards. A major risk in wireless networks occurs because the 
flaws found in WEP. This is especially true because of the key distribution problem as well 
as the initialization vector (IV) which makes possible a number of threats to break 
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encryption. Other threats that are possible in a wired environment can be launched against 
wireless networks such as denial-of-service attacks, flooding, session hijacking and more. 
This study suggests a security mechanism enhancing the wireless security to an 
adequate level by the use ofKerberos, RADIUS, WEP and 802.lx providing access and 
rights management in addition to authentication. Kerberos is installed on a FreeBSD machine 
with a list of legitimate users who can access the wireless network. When a wireless client 
wants to associate with an access point, it requires permission to get through. It will be 
challenged by the access point for authentication and the access point will pass information 
to Kerberos which tries validating a ticket for the client. In return, Kerberos will check the 
main database for users to authenticate the request. After successful authentication, Kerberos 
will communicate with RADIUS for authorization. All communications are passed in an 
encrypted format. Major threats facing wireless LAN are eavesdropping, tampering, 
unauthorized access and spoofing and denial of service. The following mechanism will give 
guidelines and implementation on how to tighten security over wireless networks. 
There is nothing called "absolutely secure." This approach, however, of building 
security measures helps narrow the number of threats and attacks that can be launched 
against WLAN. 
1.1 Introduction 
Wireless networking technology extends beyond the limited reach of traditional wired 
networks. It allows network communication to occur over the air. This kind of data 
communication offers end-users the benefits of increased mobility and increased productivity 
and this new paradigm of communication shifts the way we look at networks. With WLANs, 
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the network comes to the users wherever they happen to be. It offers installation speed and 
simplicity and it eliminates the need to pull wires and cables through walls and ceilings 
reducing expenses making it easier for future scalability. WLANs are highly deployed in hot 
spot areas such as airports, hotels and coffee shops which now offer internet over wireless 
networks providing additional value to their customers and increasing their revenues. 
Although wireless technology is still new, changes abound as problems are fixed and 
architecture is enhanced, making wireless networks more and more popular. While 
popularity increases usage, engineers, managers and users worry about the extent of LAN 
security problems. As the executive director of the Wireless LAN Association noted, 
"Security concerns have become the most visible challenge to Wireless LAN growth in the 
enterprise market" (Abramovitz 2001). With obvious known flaws in wireless encryption 
protocol WEP and with "war-driving" methods, wireless networks are fast becoming more 
msecure. 
The problem of insecure wireless LANs using 802.11-based environments is growing. 
For a wireless environment to be protected, measures of security should be provided outside 
the bounds of wireless infrastructure. One of the security obstacles is the tendency to focus 
on features before security and quality. 
The scope of this study concentrates on planned authentication services for 802.11 
WLAN. This is referred to as infrastructure mode where all wireless station communication 
is passed through an access point operating like a hub in a wired environment. In addition, it 
covers privacy and integrity services followed by authentication services and explains how 
the later benefits from these privacy services. 
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1.2 Terminology: 
802.11: The adopted IEEE standard defining the media access control (MAC) and physical 
(PHY) layers for a LAN with wireless connectivity and the protocols of data 
communications equipment using air radio or infrared. 
Ad-Hoc Network: An ad-hoc network is thought to consist of wireless nodes, with no fixed 
infrastructure, communicating without the being associated with an access point; in 
some cases, some network devices are part of the network only for the duration of a 
communication session. Literally speaking, in Latin, "ad-hoc" means "for this 
purpose only'' and is usually temporary. 
AP: Access Point. A hardware device or a computer's software that acts as a 
communication hub for users of a wireless device to connect to a wired LAN. APs are 
important for providing heightened wireless security and for extending the physical 
range of service a wireless user has access to. 
AS: Access Server. The Authentication Server provides a means to determine the identity 
of a user of a particular connection, usually based on a usemame and password. 
BSS: Basic Service Set. BSS is when a wireless network consists of at least one access 
point connected to the wired network infrastructure and a set of wireless end stations, 
it is also referred as infrastructure mode. An Extended Service Set (ESS) is a set of 
two or more BSSs that form a single subnetwork. 
Client: The client is a part of a client-server architecture. It is an application that runs on a 
personal computer or workstation and relies in a server to perform some operations. 
ISM-band: Industrial, Scientific and Medical. The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) made the commercial development of radio-based LAN components possible 
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by authorizing the public use of the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands. 
This band of frequencies resides between 902 MHz and 5.85 GHz, just above the 
cellular phone operating frequencies. 
Kerberos: An authentication system that was developed in the Athena Project at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It is a secure trusted third party 
authentication service verifying users' identities. 
Peer-to-Peer: It is a communication model of which each party has the same and 
equivalent capabilities and either one can initiate a communication session. Peer-to-
peer networks do not offer reliable performance under heavy loads. 
Protocol: An agreed-upon format for transmitting data between devices; it determines type 
of error checking, data compression method, acknowledgment of end of transmitting 
process and acknowledgment that the transmitted data was received. 
RADIUS: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service. An authentication and accounting 
system; it is a client/server protocol and software that enables remote access servers 
to communicate with a central server to authenticate dial-in users and authorize their 
access to the requested system or service. 
Server: A computer or device on a network that manages network resources. 
SSID: Service Set Identifier. A 32-character unique identifier attached to the header of 
packets sent over WLAN that acts as a password when a mobile device tries to 
connect to the Basic Service Set (BSS). 
WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy. A security protocol that was designed to provide WLAN 
with a certain level of security equivalent to the wired local area network. WEP is 
specified by the IEEE standard 802.11 b 
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NIC: Network Interface Card. A device used to connect a computer to an Ethernet 
network. 
MAC: Medium Access Control protocol. MAC is a hardware address that uniquely 
identifies each node of a network. 
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CHAPTER2 
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
Wireless local area networking is a fairly new technology that provides connectivity 
to wired infrastructures where mobility and connectivity are required. There were no 
standards governing ways of communication during the early days of wireless networking, 
but it was based on both frequency-hopping and direct-sequencing. Standards were left to 
vendors who had no provision for interoperability. Nowadays, several standards do exist for 
WLANs applications such as 802.11, HiperLAN, HomeRF SWAP and Bluetooth. 
IEEE 802.11 b is referred as the standard for WLAN s, since it is the most common 
and established protocol in use today. 802.11 b standard defines the radio frequency 
bandwidth wireless signals can use, throughput rates over the signal and how wireless 
endpoints communicate with each other. It takes the advantage of using the radio spectrum 
for public use. This spectrum is called the ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) band 
using two of the three frequency bands, the 2.4GHz-to-2.4835 GHz UHF. The maximum 
theoretical throughput that a wireless network can achieve is 1 lMbps, but tests showed on 
average it will vary between 4-6Mbps. The use of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) 
allows for greater throughput but more susceptible to radio signal interference. 
IEEE802.2 
Logictl Link Comrol (LLC) 
IEEE 802,11 
Media Access Control (MAC) 
Frequency Direct 
Hopping Sequence lnfared PHY 
Spread Spread 










Figure 1 - IEEE 802.11 standards mapped to the OSI reference model. 
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WLAN is an extension or alternative for a wired local area network. The simplest 
form of a wireless network is two workstations with wireless network interface cards (NI Cs) 
communicating in peer-to-peer network as shown below, 
Figure 2 Peer-to-peer network 
or it can be a complex ad-hoc network of hundreds or thousands of computers with wireless 
NICs communicating through multiple access points bridging network traffic to the wired 
LAN. Communication in peer-to-peer network is accomplished without APs leading to a 
limited coverage area and the clients has no access to wired resources, 
RADIUS server 
Figure 3 Multiple access point ad-hoc network [1] 
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while ad-hoc network takes advantage of overlapping cells as shown in Figure 3; the 
coverage area of the cell is determined by the characteristics of the AP. 
2.1 WLAN Topology: 
IEEE 802.11 supports three basic topologies for WLANs: 
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) 
Basic Service Set (BSS) 
Extended Service Set (ESS) 
Wireless stations in an IBSS configuration communicate with each other in an ad-
hoc, peer-to-peer basis without the presence of an AP or any wired infrastructure. It is easy to 
implement where wireless infrastructure is not required for services. IBSS configuration 
covers a limited area and is not connected to larger networks. 
In a BSS configuration, wireless stations should communicate through at least one AP 
which serves as the logical server for a single wireless LAN cell. Communication between 
clients is held through the AP. 
ESS is a combination of overlapping BSSs, each with at least one AP connected by 
distributed system means. Clients can roam between these AP in a transparent manner as 
long as coverage allow. WLAN operates on a BSS/ESS topology (figure 4), also known as 









Figure 4 Extended Service Set [2] 
2.2 WLAN Transmission Media: 
WLANs employ radio frequency (RF) and infrared (IR) electromagnetic airwaves to 
transfer data from one point to another. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set 
the ISM band for this use. The 802.11 standard specifies two different types of Layer 1 
physical interfaces for radio-based devices. One uses a frequency-hopping architecture, while 
the other uses direct sequencing sometimes referred as single-frequency approach. Each 
technology comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Most of WLAN systems use spread-spectrum technology offering a wideband radio 
frequency technique. Spread-spectrum was developed by the military because it uses 
wideband signals that are difficult to detect. DSSS is out for commercial use and currently 
applied on IEEE 802.11 WLAN systems because by design they are resistant to noise, 
interference, jamming and unauthorized detection. If a receiver is not tuned to the right 
frequency, a spread-spectrum signal would look like background noise. Spread spectrum 
modulators use one of two methods to spread the signal over a wider area: 
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frequency-hopping spread-spectrum (FHSS) 
direct sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS) 
2.2.1 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS): 
FHSS shown in Figure 5 is a transmission technology used in WLAN transmissions 
where the data signal is modulated with narrowband carrier signal that hops in a random but 
predictable sequence from frequency to frequency as a function of time over a wide band of 
frequencies. FSSS is a short-duration impulse noise for receivers who are not intended to be 
receiving this transmission. FHSS frequency range in the ISM band is divided into a series of 
I MHz channels up to 79 separate distinct channels; transmissions are sent over these 
channels in a sequence not exceeding 0.4 seconds at a time, covering all channels before 
repeating the sequence. This architecture makes minimal collision time slice; the frequency-
hopping radio will quickly hop through the band retransmitting data on another frequency. If 
a person wants to intercept this frequency, he/she should know how long to stay on each 
channel and what hopping pattern is used which is impossible to know except for 




2.4<12 GHz FREQUENCY 
IMC 
Figure 5 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum [5] 
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2.2.2 Direct Sequence Spread-Spectrum (DSSS): 
Direct sequence spread spectrum, also known as direct sequence code division 
multiple access (DS-CDMA). It consists of 11 overlapping channels of 83MHz in the 2.4-
GHz ISM-band with three "nonoverlapping" wide channels of a 22MHz each as shown in the 
figure below. DSSS supports higher data rates than FHSS due to the large bandwidth along 
with its advanced modulation based on complementary key coding (CCK). The fact that 
only three channels are not overlapping makes it possible of having three APs working 
simultaneously providing combined data rate of the three channels. One drawback of DSSS 
in comparison with FHSS is that it is interference intolerance, needless to mention that they 
are both affected by interference, but throughput in DSSS falls dramatically when 
interference is introduced. DSSS technology alone is neither a privacy nor an authentication 
feature. 
1 aec 
Figure 6 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum [5] 
The following table shows a comparison between the two different kinds of spread 
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spectrum. 
Table 1 Direct Sequence vs. Frequency Hopping 
iI:\!!!iu Dir;~ct Sequence Frequency Hopping 
- Short latency time - Long latency time 
- Constant processing gain - better - No processing gain 
signal to noise ratio 
- Quick lock-in as radios synchronize - Slow lock-in, must search a channel 
- No dwell time - 400 microsecond dwell time 
- No re-sync with other radio necessary - Must re-sync with other radio after every hop 
- Short indoor range - Short indoor range 
- Long outdoor range (~40km) - Short outdoor range ( ~ 1 Okm) 
- Greater overall data range - Lower overall data throughput 
2.3 WLAN Roaming and Mobility: 
One of the things holding up any further adoption of WLAN is the difficulty to roam 
between networks of providers. IEEE 802.11 does not specify any roaming mechanisms 
leaving it on the vendors' best practice to come up with algorithms, roaming definitions and 
decisions for its WLAN clients. 
Beacon frames are used to achieve roaming and mobility for 802.11 client devices 
allowing them to roam among multiple 802.11 base stations that may be operating on the 
same or different channels (frequencies). These beacon frames synchronize 802.11 devices in 
the infrastructure mode to associate with a base station. 
There are two ways to scan for existing 802.11 networks: active and passive 
scanning. In active scanning mode, the 802.11 device sends out "probe" frames showing its 
existence; while in passive mode, 802.11 devices listen for beacon frames, which are 
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transmitted by the active device periodically. 
Roaming differs from one vendor to another. The basic idea in roaming is for a 
wireless device making decision to roam and then finding an access point to roam to. In best 
case scenarios, roaming time will be 200msec, but on average it less than one second and that 
is due to that fact that each vendor specifies its own mechanisms for roaming. 
2.4 Security vs. Insecurity of 802.11 WLANs 
While IEEE 802.11 is expanding rapidly, many security concerns are raised and 
researchers as well as developers try to fix them. Two of the major problems that are 
addressed by wireless ad-hoc networks that are not faced by fixed-network routing protocols 
are lack of infrastructure support and the frequent change in network topology. Since data 
travels nearly everywhere in a wireless environment, unlike wired networks where data flows 
in wires and walls, precautions and securing these environments is of paramount concern. 
The following table shows different kinds of 802.1 x, when were they published and a short 
description about each one pointing out main features offered by each of them. 
Table 2 Wireless Standards and Development 
Name Published Details 
+ 
802.11 1997 Operates in a 2.4 GHz range, same as cordless phones 
802.llb 1999 Operates in a 2.4 GHz range; it's the standard used by 
most corporate wireless LANs today 
802.lla 1999 Operates in a 5 GHz range; offers less distance 
capability between base station and client 
802.llg In development Will provide enhanced security features such as 
larger encryption keys 
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2.5 The Need for Security 
Security is the combination of processes, procedures and systems used to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of information. While confidentiality is the protection 
of information from unauthorized reader, integrity protects the data content from 
unauthorized modification, and, finally, availability is the process of ensuring that a system 
or data will be accessible when needed. 
By means of the current integration of organizations towards wireless LAN s with 
wired networks, system administrators and network manager are unwilling to deploy wireless 
LAN s unless those LAN s provide a certain level of security, manageability and scalability 
offered by wired LAN. Access control and privacy are the chief concerns of security. In a 
wired LAN environment, compromising privacy can occur only if an attacker gets physical 
access to the network. On the other hand, wireless LAN broadcast data over the air using 
radio waves and, thus, received by any wireless client since data cannot be directed to a 
certain recipient. 
Trivial ways for compromising security in a wireless LAN includes data collection 
from the network through the use of radio-based packet sniffer, a stolen MAC address and 
used for accessing the network, or any other security measure that can be breached in a 
relatively short amount of time by one person using one computer. One person or a group of 
people who have spent considerable time analyzing the network and its weaknesses usually 
accomplishes non-trivial security breaches. This takes thousands of computers trying to break 
the security encryption. 
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2.6 IEEE 802.11 Security Mechanisms: 
A relationship must be established between the wireless client and the AP called 
association. There are three states governing the completion of association: 
- Unauthenticated and unassociated 
- Authenticated and unassociated 
- Authenticated and associated 
The following figure shows the classic 802.11 state machine. An 802.11 frame can be 
of two basic types: a data frame or a management frame. The client will move between the 







Figure 7 Classic State Machine of 802.11 [3] 
2. 7 Securing Access to Wireless AP: 
There are several security mechanisms built in 802.11 b standard providing basic 
security protection that is not sufficient for corporate deployment. 
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Service Set Identifier SSID : 
It is an identifier attached to packets sent over the wireless LAN that functions as a 
password for joining a particular radio network. All radios and APs within the same BSS 
must use the same SSID or their packets will be ignored. 
SSID serves to logically segment the WLAN multiple networks, each with different 
identifier programmed into one more APs. In order for a client to associate with a segment it 
should be configured with the corresponding SSID identifier of that network. SSID provides 
early stages of access control providing a simple measure of security by permitting/denying 
access through the simple password provided. SSID itself is not well secured and is well 
known and shared. Usually APs are set to broadcast their SSID in its beacons. 
Media Access Control (MAC) Access List: 
APs can be configured with a list of MAC addresses of clients that are allowed to 
access that AP. If a client's MAC address is not in the list it will be denied access. This kind 
of security measure creates management overhead and it only good for small networks. 
Unfortunately MAC address can be easily found using a sniffer since they are transmitted in 
clear text. An attacker can easily gain access to the network by configuring a wireless NIC 
with a valid sniffed MAC address. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP): 
The IEEE 802.11 for encryption and authentication between wireless clients and APs 
specifies WEP. It was designed to provide a level of privacy equivalent to a traditional wired 
network. WEP is used at the two lowest layers of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) 
reference model, data link and physical layers; thereby it does not offer end-to-end security. 
This means that it is independent of higher-level protocols such as TCP/IP and is transparent 
to them. 
OSI (Open System TCPJlP 
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Figure 8 WEP in the OSI model [38] 
WEP uses a secret key that is shared between a wireless client and an AP. However, 
WEP does not specify how this key should be distributed or even its lifetime. WEP is 
exportable and can be used in any country or any place having 802.11 standard, that was one 
of the reasons IEEE adopted WEP as its security mechanism for wireless networking. In 
addition, it is robust; WEP was developed on the RC4 stream cipher system from RSA which 
proved its efficiency since it was created in 1987. It is self synchronizing and optional; WEP 
is used on a packet-by-packet basis that makes it adaptable to environments where nodes 
move in and out of a WLAN coverage area. 802.11 networks have the option of 
enabling/disabling WEP in their network environment. Finally, it is computationally efficient 
to implement the algorithm both in hardware and software. 
WEP provides two functions; ensuring privacy through encryption while the other 
performs some level of access control. Symmetric key encryption is used in WEP which 
means the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. The secret key is stored in a 
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write only registry on the device to prevent the attacker from being able to read the key from 
a device that have been already authenticated on a network. 
----- Plaintext 




----- Transmitted Data -----
Figure 9 Encrypted WEP Frame 
WEP takes the message to be transmitted and apply a 32-bit cyclic redundancy check 
(CRC) to create the plaintext. A 24-bit initial vector (IV) is added to a 40-bit or 104-bit key. 
Using the stream cipher RC4 algorithm, the two values are transformed to a pseudorandom 
key stream. The plaintext and the key stream are taken and exclusive-ored (XORd) bitwise 




Plaintext - --------+i Plaintext 
+ 
ICV 
~- 32-bit CRC ~-....__ __ __. 
Figure 10 WEP Encryption 
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Authentication: 
There are two types of authentication in 802.11: 
Open system authentication 
Shared key authentication 
The open system authentication is the default service that is null authentication. A 
client can associate with any AP and listen to the data transmitted sent in plain text. This has 
no security and all authentication packets are sent in plain text. 
Open Authentication Request 
Open Authentication Success 
Wireless Client Access Point 
Figure 11 Open System Authentication 
As for the other type of authentication, the shared key authentication, WEP needs to 
be enabled providing a certain amount of security. The shared key resides in each client's 
MIB in a write-only form made available to the MAC coordinator. The client will ask for 
shared key authentication from the nearest AP to it, which will return unencrypted challenge 
frame containing 128 bytes of random text generated the WEP engine. The client will 
encrypt the random text using the shared key it has and send it back to the AP. The AP will 
validate the text by decrypting it and comparing it with the original one it sent and a decision 
of authenticate/reject will be issued accordingly. 
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Shared Key Authentication Request 
Key 1 • h 
Shared Key Challenge Text 
Shared Key Encrypted Tut 
Shaud Key Siiccess 
Wifeless Client 
Figure 12 Shared Key Authentication 
Access Point 
Key 1 "' h 
When authentication is granted for the client, it will then initiate the association 
process by submitting its ESSID that will be verified by the AP. If the AP verified it with a 
positive match, the AP will update its table by adding the client to the authenticated clients 
and sends back an affirmation. Now the client is connected to the network. 
2.8 802.11 Wireless Flaws and Vulnerabilities: 
Threats are launched against all wireless computer systems; these threats are capable 
of compromising the system as well as services. As mentioned earlier, an intruder needs not 
to have physical access to the wireless network like the wired one. 
2.8.1 Insertion Attack: 
Insertion attacks are based on deploying unauthorized devices on the wireless 
network without security process and review. 
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Easy Access: 
All wireless networks need to announce their existence so that clients with proper 
configurations can associate and use the services offered by that network. The network sends 
beacons periodically announcing its existence. These beacon frames are not secured by any 
privacy functions making the network and its parameters available for anybody with wireless 
802.11 NIC cards. 
An attacker carrying a wireless device will try to connect to a base-station without 
authorization. If the base-station is not configured to accept passwords, then the attacker 
manages to connect his/her wireless device to the base-station. 
Rogue Access Points: 
An access point authenticates a user and the process is not reversible. An 802.11 b 
shared-key authentication scheme employs one-way authentication and is not mutual. An 
attacker might be an employee from the company who has the capability to easily plant an 
AP in the network and, thus, creating several breaches in the network like the pervious attack 
or it might be a launching pad for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Network managers should 
implement policies of scanning their network for unauthorized APs and make sure of 
configuring the authorized APs properly. 
2.8.2 Eavesdropping of WLAN Traffic: 
Like wired LAN, wireless networks are at risk to unauthorized interception and 
monitoring of LAN traffic, the only difference is that the wireless attacker needs to be within 
the signal range of the WLAN. APs transmit their signals in circular pattern widening the 
transmission range beyond the boundaries of the area that it is supposed to cover. 
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In this case, the attacker can intercept traffic in three methods: 
1. Packet analysis, where packets are captured and analyzed 
2. Broadcast monitoring, where is an AP is connected to a hub instead 
of a switch, any network traffic across the hub can be broadcasted 
over the network 
3. Access point clones, where an attacker can fool legitimate clients to 
connect to the cloned AP and, thus being on the attacker's network 
Session Hijacking: 
An attacker sniffing wireless traffic can inject false traffic into the connection thus 
issuing commands on behalf of a legitimate user by hijacking the victim's session. 
Traffic Redirection: 
If the attacker managed poisoning the ARP tables in switches on the wired network 
through the AP causing packets to be routed through his/her machine, the attacker then can 
capture these packets and launch man-in-the-middle attack. 
2.8.3 Jamming - Denial of Service: 
DoS attacks can range from simple radio interference to more sophisticated attacks 
against an AP or a client. The attacker can send an 802.lx EAPOL-logoff message 
disconnecting the client from the WLAN. 
2.8.4 Client-to-Client Attack: 
Two clients can communicate with each other without an AP being intermediate 
between them. This means that clients should be aware from each other and protect 
themselves not only from outside attacks, but from inside, as well. 
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2.8.5 Access Point Attacks: 
Classical dictionary attack can be launched against AP since most of them use a 
single key or password that is shared with all connecting wireless clients. Once the password 
is guessed, the intruder gains access to the network. Furthermore, if keys are not changed on 
regular basis when employees leave, this is one of the major risks. 
2.8.6 Missconfiguration: 
Most APs comes in unsecured configuration mode for ease of use and fast 
deployment. If network managers didn't change the settings of these APs from their original 
default configuration, they will be at high risk of being easily compromised by an intruder 
and yet the attacker will get access to the wireless network. 
2.8. 7 Insecurity of WEP: 
Primarily, lack of a WEP key management is a major hole in its security especially in 
a wireless infrastructure network. The 802.11 does not specify a certain procedure for key 
exchange leaving it to be manually changed by network managers. This is a problem 
especially ifthe network is big and allows the key to stay in its place for a longer time so that 
attackers gain more time to launch different attacks to obtain the key and decrypt the traffic. 
Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir conducted a study studying the weaknesses ofWEP by 
launching attacks against it. The were able to implement an attack described as Fluhrer et. al. 
in several hours and then they managed to pick up tools and equipment that helped them 
successfully read the keys off 802.11 wireless networks. Their attack consisted of hardware 
and software taken off the shelf. They provided an optimized implementation of the RC4 
attack, managing to show that it is infeasible to achieve privacy with WEP under 802.11 at 
any key size. WEP encapsulation remains insecure whether the key length was 1-bit or 1000-
25 
bit or any other size. Given this attack, they pronounced that 802.11 networks are insecure. 
The deficiency and weakness that resides in WEP encapsulation algorithm indicates that RC4 
is poorly suite to this environment. 
Collisions of the Initial Vector (IV): 
One of the most severe problems facing WEP is the inappropriate way of initializing 
the vector. It was noticed that several network devices set the IV to zero and increments it by 
one with each packet. If an attacker is watching the traffic carefully, he/she could obtain the 
pattern of which the IV is added and hence compromise the value. 
Malicious Packet Injection: 
An attacker can form malicious packets if he/she knows the structure of an encrypted 
packet such as protocol header fields, with changing these fields the attacker will be able of 
injecting malicious code to the network. Although the encrypted packet has an integrity 
check in it, but still due to the way WEP is implemented it is easy to change the integrity 
check so that it is available and accepted by the destination. 
Table of IV: 
Small IV size and long term key reuse can allow an attacker to create a table of IVs 
and key streams adding to this table for each decrypted packet. This table will contain all 
possible IVs and can be used for real-time decryption. 
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CHAPTER3 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Knowing the threats help us build adequate security measures to defend our network 
from intruders. As discussed earlier, wireless networks are inherently insecure and full of 
holes. Adding Kerberos and RADIUS for authentication and authorization over the wireless 
connection is a viable alternative. 
Mr Chris Hessing at the University of Utah enumerated these concerns and others in 
his paper entitled WAAC (Wireless Authenticated Access Control). Specifically he stated: 
- The solution must authenticate any and all wireless equipment wanting 
access to the wireless infrastructure 
- The solution cannot require any applications on the machine that desires 
authentication 
-The solution cannot rely on a specific platform. It should work with all 
devices that can get a wireless network connection. 
o The solution must provide full line rate forwarding through the 
network. 
o The solution shout not use any firewalls, or other packet inspection 
methods that interfere with the performance of the traffic. 
- The solution must allow all forms of network traffic. 
- The solution must allow administrators to identify the users/machine in the 
even of a problem report from someone on the internet. 
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3.1 Approach and Design: 
The design is made to provide sufficient security over wireless network. The 
combination of 802.11 with Kerberos and RADIUS make it an empowered solution for the 
needs of wireless networks today. Kerberos is installed on a FreeBSD machine along with 
RADIUS. They both share the same data base of users. Kerberos is used for authentication 
while RADIUS is for authorization. 
When the design is in place, a wireless client cannot associate with an access point 
until the user performs a network logon. The user will enter user name and password into the 
network dialog box, the client and Kerberos both communicate for authentication through the 
AP. The client and AP will communicate to authenticate the WEP key as shown in Figure 13. 
A uthentication Requ es t 
--- % --~------------ - - · ------·--- ·-~ 
ID Reque s t 
-~~"""'""" ¥- #~-..... --~'""'"-~-'". ~ $.-- ...... ~~#-# ·""*"-"""· -~- "",.. '.* *---
ID Re s pon s e 
Wireles s Client Ac ce ss Point 
Figure 13 Wireless client associating with an access point 
All attempts by the client to gain access to the network are being blocked by the access point, 
until the client performs a network logon by supplying usemame and password. 
Kerberos and the wireless client perform mutual authentication through the access point. 
Kerberos will send an authentication challenge to the client. Kerberos will lookup the client's 
information in the database as shown in Figure 14. It will create the proper response for the 
authentication request. 
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Figure 14 Kerberos challenge request for authorization 
Upon approval, Kerberos will send the session key to the client through the AP over the 
wired network. The AP will encrypt the key using WEP and send it to the client. Kerberos 
will then communicate with RADIUS for authorization depending on which applications the 
client can access and use. Figure 15 shows how RADIUS grants authorization for a client 
access. 
Au thorization Reque s t 
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Figure 15 RADIUS Authorization for client and access acceptance 
Once authentication and authorization is granted, Kerberos will act the same as if its 




Authentication for wireless LAN has three main components: the client software, the 
authenticator (usually the access point) and the authentication server (in our case Kerberos 
and RADIUS for authentication and authorization). 
- FreeBSD 4.5 was installed on a Pentium III machine i386 (PC compatible) with 
default attributes. 
- Kerberos version 4 was installed for authentication 
- RADIUS for authorization 
The access point, Intermec 2010, communicates with the FreeBSD machine in a 
wired LAN for validation. 
~, ____ !, _, ____ ~ 








Figure 16 Client association and communication 
Figure 16 shows in steps how communication takes place between a wireless client 
and the authentication server: 
1. The client requests association to the access point. The access point detects the 
client and enables the client's port and forces it into unauthorized state so that only 
802. lx traffic is allowed. 
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2. The AP replies with an identity request. 
3. The client replies with usemame and password. 
4. The AP forwards the packet to the authentication server. 
5. The authentication server will lookup the usemame and password in the database 
available and issue accept/reject message and send to the access point. If it is 
accepted then a ticket will be issued. 
6. The access point will change the client's port state into authorized state and enables 
communication between authenticator and client. 
7. Depending of the kind of privileges that specific client has, RADIUS will give 
authorization for services. 
3.3 Kerberos: 
Kerberos is a trusted third-party service. All users and services (usually called 
principals) on the network will trust the Kerberos server. A secret password, known as the 
key, is shared between these principals and the Kerberos server, enabling these principals to 
verify that messages coming from the Kerberos server are authentic. Kerberos is built upon 
the assumption that the network is insecure. 
There are two main purposes for Kerberos: security and authentication. It is supposed 
to prevent unauthorized access to the network, and yet compromised, by the secret key 
distribution and using cryptographic protocols in order to verify the possession of these keys. 
When Kerberos was first created, it was supposed to meet some requirements. It 
should be secure, reliable, transparent and scalable. An eavesdropper shouldn't be able to 
gather as much information making him/her able to impersonate a legitimate user. Kerberos 
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should be ready to serve any process or application needs access control, lack of Kerberos 
availability will precede in lack of that application. As transparency is concerned, the user 
shouldn't be aware of any authentication process beyond entering a valid password. Finally, 
Kerberos meets the requirement of scalability in supporting large network of clients and 
servers. In the Kerberos architecture, every realm (security domain) must operate a 
physically secure environment that hosts a key distribution center (KDC). 
3.3.1 Versions of Kerberos: 
Currently, there are two versions of the Kerberos Protocol, Version 4 and Version 5. 
Kerberos is still being improved at MIT. Kerberos Version 4 suffers from some design 
limitations; for example, it does not support forwarding Kerberos credentials to hosts/servers 
which is an important feature for supporting database links. Lifetime of a ticket is limited to 
22 hours and it supports DES encryption only. Kerberos Version 5 was created to overcome 
these limitations. Unlike version 5 has an unlimited ticket lifetime, and it can start any time 
and end any time. The key salt algorithm has been changed to use the entire principal name. 
Version 5 supports forwardable, renewable and postable tickets. Furthermore, it supports 
different kinds of encryption algorithms beside DES which is the only encryption supported 
by Version 4. 
3.3.2 How Kerberos work? 
Kerberos can be summarized in four steps [ 6]: 
1. Authentication exchange 
2. Ticket-granting service exchange 
3. Client/server exchange 
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4. Secure communication 
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Figure I 7 Authentication exchange 
Ker bero s 
e u t h e ntic etio n 
se r v er 
Authentication exchange [7]: The client will ask the authentication server for a ticket to the 
ticket-granting server (TGS). The authentication server will lookup the client in the database 
and generates a session key (SKI) to be used between the client and the TGS. Kerberos will 
encrypt the sessions key (SKI) using the client's secret key. The authentication server will 
use the TGS' s secret key (known only by both TGS and the authentication server) to create 
and send the user a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) as shown in Figure 17. 
¢1i<1n I 
T arge t s er ver n ame, T OT & e uth . ... . ..... _ ... ··----·· ·-···· .. -~ 
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Figure 18 Ticket-granting service exchange 
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Ticket-granting service exchange: [7] The client will decrypt the message it received from 
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Kerberos and retrieves the session key (SKI) and use it to create an authenticator containing 
the user's name, IP address and a time stamp. The client then requests access to the target 
server by sending this authenticator along with the TGT to the TGS. The TGS decrypts the 
TGT and uses the SKI from inside TGT to decrypt the authenticator and verifies information 
in the authenticator including the client's network address, the ticket and the time stamp. The 
request proceeds once all the information matches. TGS creates a new session key (SK.2) 
encrypt it using SKI and sends it to the client to be used by the client and the target server. 
The TGS also creates a new ticket containing the client's name, network address, a time 
stamp and an expiration time for the ticket, all encrypted using the target server's secret key 
and the name of the server as shown in Figure I8. 
Clien l 
Acce ss request 
*~~-•*•~~--~-~ ~~~~ 
TK-TS 
Message with time stamp+ l 
·~~ ··~ .. ,. ..... ·---·· ·-··----·,.. ·--
encrypted with SK2 
Figure I9 Client/server exchange 
Target 
server 
Client/server exchange:[?] The client gets SK.2 by decrypting the message. Now the client is 
ready to approach the target server which will create a new authenticator encrypted with 
SK.2. The client will send the session ticket encrypted with the target server's secret key and 
the encrypted authenticator to the target server. The client proves that it knows the key 
because the authenticator contains plaintext encrypted with SK.2. An eavesdropper is 
34 
prevented from recording the ticket and authenticator for future replaying by encrypting the 
time stamp. Now, the target server decrypts the message and checks the ticket, authenticator, 
client address and time stamp. Some applications inquires mutual authentication, but the 
target server returns a message consisting of the time stamp plus 1 encrypted with SK2. This 
proves to the client that the server actually knew its own secret key and could decrypt the 
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Figure 20 Secure communications 
Secure communications:(?] Both the target server and the client share an encryption key for 
secure communication (figure 20), and both are sure that each is who is claiming to be. 
Because only the client and the target server share this key, they can assume that a recent 
message in that key originated with the other party. 
3.3.3 Kerberos Drawbacks: 
One of the main concerns about Kerberos is that it was designed for a certain 
environment (MIT); therefore, some of the assumptions do not fit with other different 
environments. Following is a list of the major shortcomings of Kerberos authentication 
system: 
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- It is vulnerable to password guessing attack. It assumes that users will not select 
poor passwords. If an attacker guesses a password correctly he/she can impersonate that 
person to any verifier. 
- It relies on the synchronization of clocks located on the different machines. If an 
attacker can change the time on a host, the authentication ticket to the network can be used 
repeatedly as a result of the non-expiring time stamp. 
- The longer the ticket is granted, the more likely it is to be stolen and used by an 
unauthorized user. 
- If the NIC is stolen in a MAC wireless system authentication method, the card has 
an inherent authentication of the user that is tied to that NIC and will be granted to access the 
network. 
- Cached key located on a computer connected to the network are accessible to an 
attacker connected to that computer, and the attacker can use these keys. 
3.4 RADIUS: 
Remote Access Dial-In User Services was developed by Livingstone Enterprises, 
Inc., as an access server authentication and authorization protocol used in networks for 
increased security. RADIUS is considered to be connectionless service. The communication 
between a network access server (NAS) and a RADIUS server is based on the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP). RADIUS is written in Java; therefore, it is independent of the 
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platform and databases. RADIUS is comprised of three components, a protocol with a frame 
format that utilizes UDP/IP. 
RADIUS is usually a daemon process running on a UNIX machine. It receives an 
access request from the client. RADIUS lookups usemame and password in the database and 
passes an access-accept or access-reject back to the client. 
3.4.1 Authentication and Authorization: 
The RADIUS server supports a variety of authentication mechanisms such as PPP, 
PAP or CHAP, UNIX login and others. A typical access query from the NAS to RADIUS is 
an access-request, which consists ofusemame, encrypted password, NAS IP and port. The 
type of session the user wants is indicated in the format of the request (example: Framed 
Type=PPP). 
Authentication and authorization are joined together in RADIUS as shown in the 
figure below. The RADIUS server will give Access-Accept ifusemame and password are 
the same as those in its database. In addition, it will include a list of attributes, value pairs 
that describe the parameters to be used in the session. These parameters include service type, 
protocol type, IP address to assign the user (static or dynamic), access list to apply, or a static 













Figure 21 RADIUS authentication and authorization sequence 
One of the benefits of RADIUS is that it authenticates a user and not a machine. 
There is no reliance on MAC or hardware addresses for authentication. It is believed that 
RADIUS runs the same on both wireless and wired environments. 
3.4.2 RADIUS Drawbacks: 
Some weaknesses are found while implanting RADIUS in a wireless 802.11 b 
environment since it was not designed to be a large network end-to-end security mechanism. 
It is vulnerable of buffer overflow if too many authentication requests are sent at the same 
time. In addition, RADIUS is capable of handling 255 messages at one time; therefore, its 
response should occur before getting 255 messages or information is lost. 
3.5 Improving Wireless Security: 
- It is agreed upon that WEP is insecure at any key size. Needless to mention the 
flaws found in its design it is highly recommended to enable it since it will act as the first 
barrier of defense in your wireless network and acts as a minimum level of security. 
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Although WEP is optional, a 40-bit encryption keys is requirement for Wi-Fi certification by 
WECA. Most ofWi-Fi certified products ships with basic encryption capabilities and 
disabled by default. By activating WEP you can keep out casual attackers. 
- Access points and wireless routers come in a default setup of SSID. It is most 
desirable to change the SSID of your product the moment it is installed on your network. The 
change should not reflect your corporation's main names or divisions. Make sure to disable 
SSID broadcast so that you will not give out you name, address or any other useful 
information to potential hackers. 
- Default passwords on access points and wireless routers should be changed the 
minute they are installed. Hackers' first choice of password stet is to use manufacturer's 
default password and gain access to your network. Passwords should be chosen wisely and 
not simple to guess or dictionary attack breakable. 
- Access points deployment in the corporations should be chosen wisely to minimize 
the signal leak outside of its intended range. 
- Periodically check and make a site survey for "rogue" access points in your wireless 
network. Some internal users may install rogue access points to extend coverage area. These 
access points can be of threat to the network. Administrators are advised to scan network 
premises for unauthentic access points. 
- Make sure you have a good wireless security policy and architecture design. This 
helps in future management of expansions. 
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- User awareness is one of the major tasks network managers should encourage 
educating employees about security management of the company is an important aspect of 
keeping the flow of information secure and consistently correct. 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
It is an understatement to say that wireless networks must have security. 
Unfortunately the current solutions do not offer sufficient levels of security. The nature of 
radio communication makes it difficult to prevent attacks exposed against the network by 
intruders. Flaws are continually found in current technology of 802.11 b. One of the most 
significant problems found in the WEP algorithm is the way it encrypts packets of data using 
a stream cipher. "WEP is assumed to be cracked now," says Chris Rouland, director of the 
X-Force vulnerability research unit at Internet Security Systems Inc in Atlanta. "If you watch 
enough good traffic on a WEP network, you can crack everything in about 12 hours." 
Although WEP has a strong encryption, it faces problems in vector initialization. 
Security goals such as confidentiality, access control and data integrity never change, 
but there is always a need for more research and specific management tools that helps 
achieve sufficient security for a specific environment. Kerberos is strong in authenticating 
users if the KDC , client machine and network servers are secured. There are drawbacks if 
these aspects ofKerberos are not available for a certain application. CERT warned that a 
buffer overflow in the Kerberos administration daemon could allow a remote attacker to gain 
root privileges. 
Although RADIUS is new and not widely implemented, it is showing strong 
authorization and authentication techniques. It mostly has Kerberos' features and strengths, it 
aids in the authentication process of WLAN users. It needs to run through many tests under 
WLAN environment. Finally, the industry is pushing 802. lx to be the wireless standard, yet 
consumers will have to be convinced to buy products that support it. 
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It is recommended for security administrators to deploy several layers of defense 
across the network to mitigate threats. Securing the WLAN is one component of the overall 
enterprise security framework. The current design helps minimizing threats launched against 
the system such as eavesdropping, impersonation attacks and session hijacking. It enforces 
integrity between servers and access points but it is still susceptible for DoS attacks and syn 
flood attacks. It helps against war-driving attacks, unauthorized access to wireless networks, 
by checking the integrity of the user through the authentication and authorization 
implemented by the use of RADIUS and Kerberos. Administrators can monitor users through 
RADIUS's accounting system. Multiple implementations of the RADIUS protocol contain a 
buffer over in the function that calculates message digest.[ 4] This design helps against 
passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical analysis as well as active attacks to 
inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations. The mutual packet exchange between 
the AP and the authentication server helps against active attacks such as tricking the AP by a 
mobile user. The implementation of such security procedures protects the network side and 
further work should be implemented on the actual nodes which might be vulnerable to 
attacks that can be launched at a peer-to-peer level. 
Most of the offered solutions to secure wireless network require careful design, 
planning and engineering. Continuous learning of new vulnerabilities and holes in system is 
required for a decent level of defense. Enhancing basic measures increases security and make 
it effectively more difficult to gain access to the network. 
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4.1 Future work: 
- Implementing VPN technology to secure wireless network since VPN can be used 
to create a secure tunnel over an insecure protocol like IP. The VPN servers provide 
encapsulation, authentication and full encryption over the WLAN. The resulting outcome 
will be a transparent, fully protected access to network resources. VPN servers are centrally 
administered and thus easily scalable and have less overhead workload. VPN can work under 
many scenarios ranging from campus networks to enterprise corporations. 
- Site survey on the current design scalability and how efficient it will be for big 
corporations where there will be many AP's and servers. Performing load, stress and 
performance testing can verify how the current design performs when many users are 
connected thus testing roaming users and how efficient is the hand-off process from one AP 
to the other and the response time under high usage. 
- Launching several kinds of attacks from a wired base environment over the wireless 
environment would uncover anomalies that may only become apparent over wireless and not 
over the wired. It will be a good idea to check what threats and attacks can be done over 
wired LAN that cannot be launched on a wireless LAN. 
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